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RECENT	DEVELOPMENTS	UNDER	THE	BRUSSELS	I	REGULATION	
Abstract	This	article	considers	recent	CJEU	case	law	on	the	Brussels	I	Regulation.	
Two	aspects	of	Article	7(1)	(which	applies	to	matters	relating	to	a	contract)		are	
considered:	the	first	is	whether	the	contract	must	be	between	the	parties	to	the	
case;	the	second	is	whether	membership	of	an	association	should	be	regarded	as	
constituting	implied	consent	to	be	bound	by	decisions	of	the	association	so	that	
jurisdiction	to	enforce	them	may	be	taken	under	Article	7(1).	The	article	also	
discusses	recent	case	law	on	who	counts	as	a	‘consumer’	in	terms	of	Article	17.	
Key	words:	Brussels	I	Regulation,	claims	in	contract,	members	of	an	association,	consumers.	
I.		MATTERS	RELATING	TO	A	CONTRACT	
Article	7(1)	of	Brussels	2012	lays	down	jurisdictional	rules	which	apply	‘in	matters	relating	to	
a	contract’.	It	provides	that	the	courts	for	the	place	of	performance	of	the	obligation	in	
question	have	jurisdiction.1	In	order	to	decide	whether	this	ground	of	jurisdiction	applies	in	
a	given	case,	one	must	first	decide	whether	the	action	concerns	a	matter	‘relating	to	a	
contract’.		This	seemingly	simple	phrase	gives	rise	to	a	host	of	issues.	In	this	article,	we	will	
consider	two.	The	first	is:	who	must	the	contract	be	between?	Must	it	be	between	the	
parties	to	the	case	or	is	it	sufficient	if	it	is	between	other	persons?	
A.	Contract	Between	Whom?	
In	Handte	v.	TMCS,2	the	CJEU	said	that	what	is	now	Brussels	2012,	Article	7(1)	(then	Article	
5(1)	of	the	Brussels	Convention)		does	not	apply	if	there	is	no	obligation	freely	assumed	by	
one	party	towards	another.	Until	recently,	it	was	generally	assumed	that	this	meant	that	the	
contract	must	be	between	the	parties	to	the	case.	The	claim	in	Handte	arose	when	a	
German	manufacturer	(Handte	Germany)	sold	a	product	to	a	French	company	(Handte	
France),3	and	the	latter	resold	it	to	another	French	company,	TMCS.	The	product	was	
defective4	and	TMCS	sued	the	manufacturer	in	France.	The	action	was	in	contract,	not	tort.	
Did	what	is	now	Article	7(1)	of	Brussels	2012	give	jurisdiction	to	the	French	courts?5	There	
was	a	contract	between	the	manufacturer	and	Handte	France;	and	there	was	another	
contract	between	Handte	France	and	TMCS.	However,	there	was	no	contract	between	
TMCS	and	the	manufacturer.	As	a	matter	of	substantive	French	law,	the	claim	in	these	
circumstances	could	be	brought	in	contract,	apparently	on	the	basis	of	an	implied	
assignment:	Handte	France	was	deemed	to	have	assigned	its	rights	against	the	
	
1	Article	7(1)(b)	goes	on	to	lay	down	rules	for	determining	where	the	place	of	performance	is.	
2	Case	C-26/91,	[1992]	ECR	I-3967	34.	
3	Handte	France	appeared	to	be	the	subsidiary	of	Handte	Germany,	but	this	was	not	certain.	
4	It	was	said	that	it	did	not	comply	with	the	rules	on	hygiene	and	safety	at	work	and	was	unfit	for	its	purpose.		
5	This	was	not	the	only	provision	on	which	the	French	courts	might	have	obtained	jurisdiction.	As	was	pointed	
out	by	Advocate	General	Jacobs	in	paragraph	5	of	his	Opinion,	there	were	several	other	provisions	which	
might,	depending	on	the	facts,	have	been	applicable.	These	were	Article	5(3)	of	the	Brussels	Convention	
(matters	relating	to	tort),	Article	5(5)	of	the	Convention	(branch,	agency,	or	other	establishment:	Handte	
France	was	also	a	party	to	the	proceedings),	Article	6(1)	(multiple	defendants)	and	Article	6(2)	(third-party	
proceedings).	
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manufacturer	to	TMCS.6	However,	this	rule	of	French	law	did	not	answer	the	jurisdictional	
question	because	the	meaning	of	provisions	in	what	was	then	the	Brussels	Convention,	and	
is	now	Brussels	2012,	cannot	depend	on	national	law.	
After	saying	that	what	is	now	Article	7(1)	of	Brussels	2012,	‘is	not	to	be	understood	as	
covering	a	situation	in	which	there	is	no	obligation	freely	assumed	by	one	party	towards	
another’,7	and	pointing	out	that	in	a	situation	such	as	that	in	the	case,	the	manufacturer	has	
no	contractual	relationship	with	the	sub-buyer	and	undertakes	no	contractual	obligation	
towards	that	buyer,8	the	CJEU	ruled	that	what	is	now	Article	7(1)	of	Brussels	2012	does	not	
apply	to	an	action	between	a	sub-buyer	of	goods	and	the	manufacturer,	who	is	not	the	
seller,	relating	to	defects	in	those	goods	or	to	their	unsuitability	for	their	intended	purpose.9	
In	these	circumstances,	it	is	hard	to	see	how	the	‘obligation	freely	assumed’	can	be	anything	
other	than	an	obligation	assumed	by	one	of	the	parties	to	the	case	towards	the	other.	
Recent	cases,	however,	show	that	this	is	not	so.	The	first	is	Kareda.10	This	concerned	a	
couple	who	obtained	a	loan	from	an	Austrian	bank	to	buy	a	house	in	Austria.	Under	the	loan	
agreement,	they	were	jointly	and	severally	liable.	After	a	time,	their	relationship	broke	
down	and	the	woman	returned	to	her	home	country,	Estonia.	Thereafter,	the	man	paid	all	
the	instalments	as	they	became	due.	Subsequently,	he	sued	her	in	Austria	for	her	share	of	
the	debt.	He	said	that	the	Austrian	courts	had	jurisdiction	under	Article	7(1)	of	Brussels	
2012.	While	it	is	clear	that	each	of	them	had	a	contract	with	the	bank,	it	might	be	thought	
that	there	was	no	contract	between	the	two	of	them.	The	CJEU,	however,	held	that	the	
claim	did	relate	to	a	contract	in	terms	of	Article	7(1),	thus	suggesting	that	the	freely	
consented	obligation	need	not	be	between	the	parties	to	the	claim,	but	may	be	between	
each	of	them	and	a	third	person.11	
The	next	case	was	flightright,12	a	case	under	an	EU	Regulation13	giving	passengers	on	
commercial	airlines	the	right	to	compensation	if	the	flight	is	late.	The	case	concerned	a	
situation	which	can	arise	quite	often:	the	passenger	wants	to	fly	from	A	to	B,	but	to	do	so,	
he	has	to	go	first	from	A	to	X	and	then	from	X	to	B.	The	two	flights	may	be	on	different	
airlines;	nevertheless,	it	is	often	possible	to	obtain	a	single	ticket	from	one	carrier,	known	as	
the	‘contractual	air	carrier’	(‘CAC’),	which	also	covers	the	leg	operated	by	the	other	carrier,	
known	as	the	‘operating	air	carrier’	(‘OAC’).	In	this	situation,	the	passenger	has	a	contract	
	
6	A	similar	rule	also	applied	in	the	law	of	Belgium	and	of	Luxembourg.	For	a	discussion	of	the	law	of	France,	
Belgium	and	Luxembourg,	see	per	Advocate	General	Jacobs	at	paragraph	20	of	his	Opinion:	
ECLI:EU:C:1992:176.	
7	Paragraph	15	of	the	judgment.	
8	Paragraph	20	of	the	judgment.	
9	Paragraph	21	of	the	judgment.	
10	Case	C-249/16,	ECLI:EU:C:2017:472.	
11	Advocate	General	Bot	took	the	view	that	the	rights	inter	se	of	the	two	debtors	were	inseparable	from	the	
relationship	between	the	debtors	and	the	creditor.	He	also	pointed	out	that	under	Article	16	of	Rome	I,	if	a	
creditor	has	a	claim	against	several	debtors	who	are	liable	for	the	same	claim,	and	one	of	the	debtors	has	
already	satisfied	the	claim,	the	law	governing	the	debtor's	obligation	towards	the	creditor	also	governs	the	
debtor's	right	to	claim	recourse	from	the	other	debtors.	The	CJEU	took	up	this	point	in	paragraph	32	of	the	
judgment.	
12	Joined	Cases	C-274/16,	C-447/16	and	C-448/16,	ECLI:EU:C:2018:160.	
13	Regulation	261/2004.	
3	
	
with	the	CAC	but	not	with	the	OAC,	though	the	CAC	will	have	a	contract	with	the	OAC.	If	the	
OAC	is	the	one	at	fault	and	the	passenger	sues	it	(as	he	is	entitled	to	do	under	the	
Regulation),	is	the	claim	a	matter	‘relating	to	a	contract’?	The	CJEU	said	it	was.	It	said	that	
Article	7(1)	of	Brussels	2012	‘is	based	on	the	cause	of	action,	not	the	identity	of	the	
parties’.14		Since	the	OAC	is	regarded	as	fulfilling	the	obligations	of	the	CAC	towards	the	
passenger,15	the	passenger’s	claim	relates	to	a	contract	in	terms	of	Article	7(1).	
In	Králová	v.	Primera	Air	Scandinavia16	the	same	principle	was	applied	to	a	package	holiday	
in	which	the	traveller	had	a	contract	with	a	travel	agent	but	not	with	the	airline.	The	flight	
was	delayed	and	the	passenger	sued	the	airline.	The	CJEU	held	that	the	claim	was	covered	
by	Article	7(1).	
This	was	followed	by	Feniks,17	which	concerned	an	actio	pauliana.	This	is	an	action,	derived	
from	Roman	law,	which	is		found	in	many	Continental	legal	systems.	It	is	brought	when	a	
debtor	transfers	his	property	to	a	third	party	to	fraudulently	deprive	the	creditor	of	his	
rights.	Under	it,	the	creditor	can	sue	the	third	party	for	a	declaration	that	the	transfer	is	not	
valid	against	the	creditor.	He	can	then	recover	the	debt	out	of	the	property	in	question.	The	
question	in	the	case	was	whether	the	court	can	obtain	jurisdiction	in	the	creditor’s	action	
against	the	third	party	under	what	is	now	Article	7(1)	of	Brussels	2012.	The	CJEU	said	that	it	
could.	The	relevant	contract	would	be	the	contract	between	the	debtor	and	the	creditor	
under	which	the	debt	arose.	The	action	against	the	third	party	can	then	be	brought	in	the	
courts	for	the	place	of	performance	of	that	contract,	even	though	the	defendant	in	the	
action	(the	third	party)	was	not	a	party	to	that	contract.	
The	last	case	to	consider	is	Reitbauer,18	which	concerned	a	claim	which	was	similar	to	an	
actio	pauliana.	A	woman	domiciled	in	Italy	owned	a	house	in	Austria.	She	hired	a	contractor	
to	renovate	the	house	but	did	not	pay	him.	She	then	executed	a	charge	over	the	house	in	
favour	of	a	man	domiciled	in	Italy	with	whom	she	had	previously	been	living.	This	was	to	
secure	a	debt	which	she	allegedly	owed	him.	The	contractor	who	had	worked	on	the	house	
subsequently	registered	another	charge	over	the	house	to	secure	his	claim.	When	the	house	
was	sold,	the	money	it	fetched	was	barely	enough	to	cover	the	first	charge	(which	had	
priority);	so	there	was	almost	nothing	left	for	the	contractor.	The	contractor	then	brought	
proceedings	in	the	nature	of	an	actio	pauliana	to	have	the	first	charge	set	aside	as	being	in	
fraud	of	his	claim.	The	CJEU	again	held	that	the	actio	pauliana	was	covered	by	Article	7(1)	of	
Brussels	2012.	The	relevant	contract	was	that	between	the	woman	and	the	contractor	to	
renovate	the	house.	Since	the	place	of	performance	of	that	contract	was	Austria,	the	
Austrian	courts	had	jurisdiction	to	hear	the	actio	pauliana.		
In	these	recent	cases,	the	crucial	point	is	the	statement	made	by	the	CJEU	that	Article	7(1)	
of	Brussels	2012	is	based	on	the	cause	of	action,	not	the	identity	of	the	parties.19	This	seems	
	
14	Paragraph	61	of	the	judgment	in	flightright,	citing	paragraphs	31	and	33	of	the	judgment	in	Kareda.	
15	Regulation	261/2004,	Article	3(5),	second	sentence.	
16	Case	C-215/18,	ECLI:EU:C:2020:235.	
17	Case	C-337/17,	ECLI:EU:C:2018:805.	
18	Case	C-722/17,	ECLI:EU:C:2019:577.	
19	Paragraph	61	of	the	judgment	in	flightright,	citing	paragraphs	31	and	33	of	the	judgment	in	Kareda.	
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to	mean	that	if	the	cause	of	action	is	a	matter	relating	to	a	contract,	it	does	not	matter	if	the	
parties	to	the	case	are	not	the	same	as	the	parties	to	the	contract.	The	Handte	decision	
might	seem	hard	to	reconcile	with	this	principle.	The	claim	in	that	case	was	brought	in	
contract.	It	was	based	on	two	contracts,	one	between	the	claimant	(TMCS)	and	Handte	
France,	and	one	between	Handte	France	and	the	defendant	(the	manufacturer).	If	what	
matters	is	the	cause	of	action,	not	the	identity	of	the	parties,	why	was	the	case	not	covered	
by	what	is	now	Article	7(1)?		
The	fact	that	in	this	situation	a	claim	in	contract	is	not	possible	under	most	legal	systems	
may	have	been	the	determining	factor.20	It	is	usually	said	that	the	characterization	of	a	claim	
for	jurisdictional	purposes	should	be	based	on	a	uniform	European	rule,	not	on	its	
characterization	under	national	law.21	If	this	were	done,	the	claim	in	the	Handte	situation	
would	probably	be	regarded	as	being	in	tort,	since	in	most	legal	systems	a	claim	against	a	
manufacturer	when	there	is	no	direct	contract	between	it	and	the	claimant	can	be	brought,	
if	at	all,	only	in	tort.	It	would	then	come	under	Brussels	2012,	Article	7(2),	not	Article	7(1).	All	
the	CJEU	decided	in	Handte	was	that	what	is	now	Article	7(1)	does	not	apply	to	an	action	
between	a	sub-buyer	of	goods	and	the	manufacturer,	who	is	not	the	seller,	relating	to	
defects	in	those	goods	or	to	their	unsuitability	for	their	intended	purpose.	If	the	true	ground	
of	the	decision	is	that	the	claim	concerned	a	matter	relating	to	tort,	not	a	matter	relating	to	
a	contract,22	the	judgment	can	be	reconciled	with	the	cases	discussed	previously.	
If	the	claim	were	to	be	characterized,	for	jurisdictional	purposes,23	as	coming	under	Article	
7(2),	the	next	question	would	be:	what	should	constitute	the	‘harmful	event’	and	where	
should	it	be	regarded	as	having	occurred?	It	seems	that	in	Handte	the	product	did	not	cause	
physical	harm	to	any	person	or	property;	so	under	many	legal	systems	there	would	have	
been	no	tort	at	all.	Under	French	law,	the	position	was	different.	Advocate	General	Jacobs	
thought	that,	if	there	was	no	physical	harm,	the	harmful	event	should	be	regarded	as	the	
delivery	of	the	goods	to	the	first	purchaser	(Handte	France,	in	the	case).	If,	on	the	other	
hand,	there	was	physical	harm,	it	should	be	the	place	where	that	harm	occurred.	This	would	
usually	be	the	place	where	the	sub-purchaser	(TMCS,	in	the	case)	used	the	product.24		
	
20	See	paragraph	10	of	the	judgment	in	Handte.		
21	See	per	Advocate	General	Jacobs	at	paragraph	22	of	his	Opinion,	citing	Case	9/87,	Arcado	v.	Haviland	[1988]	
ECR	1539,	at	paragraphs	10	and	11	of	the	judgment.		
22	In	Advocate	General	Jacobs’	view,	this	was	the	essential	issue	in	the	case:	see	paragraphs	6	et	seq.	of	his	
Opinion.		
23	The	characterization	of	a	claim	for	jurisdictional	purposes	does	not	affect	the	basis	on	which	it	will	be	
decided	as	a	matter	of	substantive	law.	As	Advocate	General	Jacobs	said	at	paragraph	24	of	his	Opinion:	‘A	
court	that	acquires	jurisdiction	under	Article	5(1)	[now	Article	7(1)]	is	not	prevented	by	the	Convention	from	
proceeding	with	the	action	on	the	basis	that	it	is	delictual	and	a	court	that	acquires	jurisdiction	under	Article	
5(3)	[now	Article	7(2)]	is	not	prevented	by	the	Convention	from	proceeding	with	the	action	on	the	basis	that	it	
is	contractual.’	However,	if	it	does	proceed	on	the	basis	that	the	claim	is	contractual,	the	question	of	choice	of	
law	arises.	It	is	not	clear	whether	a	claim	in	contract	can	be	successful	in	the	Handte	situation	unless	both	
contracts	are	governed	by	a	system	of	law	that	adopts	the	French	solution.	On	the	facts	of	Handte,	the	
contract	between	Handte	Germany	and	Handte	France	would	today	be	governed	by	German	law	unless	there	
was	a	choice-of-law	clause:	Rome	I,	Article	4(1)(a).	German	law	does	not	adopt	the	French	solution.	
24	See	paragraphs	25–39	of	the	Opinion.	
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The	recent	case	of	Verein	für	Konsumenteninformation	v.	Volkswagen	AG,25	however,	
suggests	a	different	solution.	This	case	arose	out	of	the	scandal	when	Volkswagen	installed	
special	software	in	some	of	its	cars	so	as	to	produce	misleading	results	when	they	were	
tested	for	exhaust	gas	emissions.	It	was	only	through	this	manoeuvre	that	Volkswagen	was	
able	to	obtain	type	approval	for	vehicles	with	its	EA	189	engine.	This	was	unlawful	under	EU	
law.		
The	Verein	für	Konsumenteninformation	(the	‘VKI’)	was	an	Austrian	consumer	organization.	
Over	500	Austrian	motorists	who	had	bought	the	cars	in	question	had	assigned	their	claims	
for	compensation	to	the	VKI.	It	sued	Volkswagen	in	tort	in	an	Austrian	court.	It	claimed	that	
the	damage	consisted	in	the	fact	that,	had	they	been	aware	of	the	manipulation,	the	
motorists	would	either	not	have	purchased	the	vehicles	or	would	have	purchased	them	at	a	
price	reduced	by	at	least	30	per	cent.	Since	the	vehicles	were	defective	from	the	outset,	
their	market	value,	and	therefore	their	purchase	price,	were	significantly	lower	than	the	
purchase	price	actually	paid.	The	VKI	argued	that	the	difference	constituted	a	recoverable	
loss.		
The	question	before	the	CJEU	was	whether	the	Austrian	court	had	jurisdiction	against	
Volkswagen,	a	German	company,	under	Article	7(2)	of	Brussels	2012.	Since	the	motorists	
had	not	bought	their	cars	directly	from	Volkswagen—they	had	either	bought	them	from	
Austrian	dealers	supplied	by	Volkswagen	or	had	bought	them	second-hand	from	the	original	
purchasers—the	case	was	similar	to	Handte.	Did	the	harmful	event	occur	in	Austria?	
The	CJEU	held	that	it	did.	It	said	that	the	installation	of	the	software	by	Volkswagen	
constituted	the	causal	act.	This	occurred	in	Germany.	However,	the	actual	damage	occurred	
when	the	purchasers	bought	their	cars	in	Austria:	this	was	not	mere	consequential	loss,	not	
to	be	taken	into	account	under	the	CJEU’s	decision	in	Marinari.26	The	CJEU	said:27	
Such	damage,	which	did	not	exist	before	the	purchase	of	the	vehicle	by	the	final	
purchaser	who	considers	himself	adversely	affected,	constitutes	initial	damage	…	
and	not	an	indirect	consequence	of	the	harm	initially	suffered	by	other	persons...	
The	CJEU	went	on	to	hold,	rather	surprisingly,	that	this	was	not	pure	financial	damage.28	It	
said	that,	unlike	in	the	cases	on	investment	loss,29	it	concerned	a	defect	in	a	tangible	asset,	a	
car.30	It	therefore	concluded	that	the	claim	was	for	material	damage	‘resulting	from	a	loss	in	
value	of	each	vehicle	concerned	and	stemming	from	the	fact	that,	with	the	disclosure	that	
software	which	manipulates	data	relating	to	exhaust	gas	emissions	was	installed,	the	
purchaser	received,	in	return	for	the	payment	made	to	purchase	such	a	vehicle,	a	vehicle	
which	is	defective	and,	accordingly,	has	a	lower	value.’31	
	
25	Case	C-343/19,	ECLI:EU:C:2020:534.	
26		Case	C-364/93,	EU:C:1995:289.	
27	At	paragraph	31	of	the	judgment.	
28	Paragraph	32	of	the	judgment.	
29	Kronhofer,	Case	C-168/02,	EU:C:2004:364;	Kolassa	Case	C-375/13,	EU:C:2015:37;	and	Löber	Case	C-304/17,	
EU:C:2018:701.	
30	Paragraph	33	of	the	judgment.	
31	Paragraph	34	of	the	judgment.	
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If	we	transpose	this	reasoning	to	the	Handte	case	viewed	as	a	claim	in	tort,	it	could	be	
argued	that	TMCS’s	loss	consisted	in	the	fact	that	the	product	did	not	comply	with	the	rules	
on	hygiene	and	safety	at	work	and	was	unfit	for	its	purpose.	One	assumes	that	TMCS	would	
not	have	bought	the	product	if	it	had	known	this.	On	the	reasoning	of	the	Volkswagen	case,	
this	was	direct	(not	consequential)	loss	which	occurred	only	when	the	product	was	bought	
by	TMCS.	It	would	seem	that	the	place	of	the	damage	was	the	place	where	the	product	was	
delivered	to	TMCS.	We	shall	have	to	see	whether	this	reasoning	is	accepted	if	the	question	
ever	comes	before	the	CJEU.	
B.	What	Constitutes	Agreement?	
The	next	question	to	consider	is:	what	constitutes	agreement	to	the	contract?	This	question	
can	arise	where	the	defendant	is	a	member	of	an	association,	and	the	association	takes	a	
decision	imposing	an	obligation—usually	financial—on	its	members.	Can	proceedings	to	
enforce	the	obligation	be	brought	under	Brussels	2012,	Article	7(1),	even	if	the	defendant	
opposed	the	decision?	
Kerr	v.	Postnov	and	Postnova32	concerned	relations	among	co-owners	of	flats	in	a	block	of	flats	in	
Bulgaria.	Under	Bulgarian	law,	the	association	of	owners	(which	did	not	have	legal	personality)	could	
adopt	resolutions	in	a	general	meeting,	imposing	contributions	on	the	individual	owners	for	the	
maintenance	of	communal	areas.	A	number	of	such	resolutions	had	been	adopted,	but	two	co-
owners,	Mr	Postnov	and	Ms	Postnova,	who	were	domiciled	in	Ireland,	had	not	paid.	Mr	Kerr,	who	
was	the	manager	of	the	property,	brought	proceedings	against	them	in	a	court	in	Bulgaria.	The	
question	before	the	CJEU	was	whether	the	Bulgarian	court	had	jurisdiction	under	Article	7(1)	of	
Brussels	2012.	
The	CJEU	held	that	it	did.	It	reached	this	conclusion	in	two	steps.	First,	it	held	on	the	basis	of	a	line	of	
earlier	cases	that,	for	Article	7(1)	to	apply,	it	is	not	necessary	for	there	to	be	a	contract,	as	long	as	
there	is	a	legal	obligation	freely	consented	to	by	one	person	towards	another	that	forms	the	basis	of	
the	claimant's	action.33	It	then	referred	to	an	older	line	of	cases	that	established	that	obligations	
relating	to	the	payment	of	a	sum	of	money	which	have	their	basis	in	the	relationship	between	an	
association	and	its	members	must	be	regarded	as	'matters	relating	to	a	contract'	within	the	
meaning	of	what	is	now	Article	7(1),	on	the	ground	that	membership	of	an	association	creates	
between	the	members	close	links	of	the	same	kind	as	those	which	are	created	between	the	parties	
to	a	contract.34	
It	made	no	difference,	the	CJEU	held,	that	owners	of	the	property	in	Kerr	v.	Postnov	and	Postnova	
automatically	became	members	of	the	association	and	that	some	may	not	have	taken	part	in	the	
adopting	of	the	decision,	or	may	have	opposed	it.	By	becoming	and	remaining	the	owner	of	a	
property	in	a	building,	each	owner	agreed	to	be	subject	to	all	the	provisions	in	the	act	governing	the	
association	of	property	owners	and	the	decisions	adopted	by	the	general	meeting	of	the	owners.35	
This	was	sufficient	to	give	rise	to	an	obligation	freely	consented	to	by	the	defendants.	
	
32	Case	C-25/18,	ECLI:EU:C:2019:376.	
33	Česká	spořitelna,	Case	C-419/11,	EU:C:2013:165,	at	paragraphs	46	and	47;	Kolassa,	Case	C-375/13,	
EU:C:2015:37,	at	paragraph	39;	ÖFAB,	Case	C-147/12,	EU:C:2013:490,	at	paragraph	33;	and	Austro-Mechana,	
Case	C-572/14,	EU:C:2016:286,	at	paragraphs	35	and	36).	
34	Peters	Bauunternehmung,	Case	34/82,	EU:C:1983:87,	at	paragraphs	13	and	15;	Powell	Duffryn,	Case	
C-214/89,	EU:C:1992:115,	at	paragraph	15;	and	Engler,	Case	C-27/02,	EU:C:2005:33,	at	paragraph	47.	
35	Paragraph	29	of	the	judgment	in	Kerr.	
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A	slightly	more	difficult	question	came	before	the	CJEU	in	Ordre	des	avocats	du	barreau	de	Dinant	v.	
JN.28	The	claimant	in	this	case	was	a	local	bar	association	in	Belgium,	the	Dinant	Bar	Association.	In	
Belgium,	there	appear	to	be	a	number	of	local	bar	associations,	and	membership	of	such	an	
association	is	obligatory	for	anyone	wanting	to	practise	law.	The	local	bar	associations	have	the	
power	to	require	their	members	to	pay	dues.	The	money	raised	is	mainly	for	the	purpose	of	providing	
insurance	coverage	for	the	members.	JN	was	a	Belgian	avocat	(barrister),	who	was	a	member	of	the	
Dinant	Bar	Association,	but	was	domiciled	in	France.	He	had	not	paid	his	dues	and	the	Dinant	Bar	
Association	brought	proceedings	before	a	court	in	Belgium.	The	court	asked	the	CJEU	whether	it	had	
jurisdiction	under	Article	7(1)	of	Brussels	2012	
It	seems	that	all	the	bar	associations	in	the	French-speaking	part	of	Belgium,	together	with	the	small	
German-speaking	part,	were	members	of	a	wider	organization,	the	Association	of	the	French-
speaking	and	German-speaking	Bars,	which	was	a	legal	person	governed	by	public	law.	Bar	
associations	were	not	concerned	only	with	protecting	the	interests	of	their	members.		According	to	
the	Advocate	General,	they	also	had	a	duty	to	the	general	public	to	guarantee	the	integrity	and	
experience	of	lawyers	and	to	ensure	the	sound	administration	of	justice.36	These	facts	made	it	more	
difficult	to	regard	the	relationship	between	a	local	bar	association	and	its	members	as	purely	
contractual.	
For	this	reason,	the	CJEU—although	it	adopted	the	same	analysis	as	in	the	previous	case—said	that	
the	Belgian	court	would	have	jurisdiction	only	if	two	conditions	were	fulfilled.	First,	the	bar	association	
must	not	have	been	acting	in	the	exercise	of	public	powers	in	imposing	the	dues.	If	it	were,	the	
proceedings	would	fall	outside	the	subject-matter	scope	of	the	Regulation.	Secondly,	the	dues	must	
constitute	consideration	for	services	provided	by	the	bar	association	to	its	members	and	those	
services	must	have	been	freely	consented	to	by	the	member	concerned.	In	both	cases,	the	national	
court	was	to	decide	whether	these	conditions	were	met.	
It	is	not	unreasonable	in	principle	to	say	that	if	an	association	imposes	an	obligation	on	its	members,	
they	should	be	regarded	as	having	consented	to	it	by	virtue	of	the	fact	that	they	voluntarily	joined	the	
association	and	remained	a	member	after	it	had	imposed	the	obligation.	However,	if	taken	too	far,	
this	idea	can	produce	ridiculous	results.	One	cannot	say,	for	example,	that,	by	living	and	working	in	a	
country,	a	taxpayer	consents	to	pay	income	tax,	thus	making	an	action	for	the	recovery	of	tax	a	matter	
falling	under	Article	7(1).	It	was	probably	to	avoid	such	a	result	that	the	CJEU	imposed	these	two	
conditions.	
	
II.	WHO	COUNTS	AS	A	CONSUMER	UNDER	THE	BRUSSELS	I	REGULATION?	
The	Brussels	I	Regulation,	in	common	with	other	EU	and	national	measures,	regards	
consumers	as	being	in	need	of	special	protection	when	they	conclude	contracts	with	
business	people.	Consumers	are	at	a	disadvantage	in	such	a	situation:	they	lack	bargaining	
power	and	experience.	In	the	field	of	jurisdiction,	for	example,	the	contract	will	often	
contain	a	choice-of-court	clause	giving	exclusive	jurisdiction	to	a	court	in	a	distant	country	
whose	language	the	consumer	does	not	understand.	In	practice,	this	often	means	that	the	
consumer	has	no	legal	remedy	if	there	is	a	problem	with	the	goods	or	services	supplied.	The	
idea	that	competition	will	solve	these	problems	has	proved	false:	if	the	consumer	goes	to	a	
different	supplier,	he	will	find	that	the	contractual	terms	are	just	the	same.	
	
36	Paragraph	34	of	the	Opinion:	ECLI:EU:C:2019:86.	
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The	solution	of	Brussels	I	is	to	lay	down	special	jurisdictional	rules,	which	are	deliberately	
skewed	in	favour	of	the	consumer.	They	apply	to	contracts37	concluded	by	a	consumer	when	
the	contract	is:38		
(a)	for	the	sale	of	goods	on	instalment	credit	terms;	
(b)	for	a	loan	repayable	by	instalments,	or	for	any	other	form	of	credit,	made	to	
finance	the	sale	of	goods;	or	
(c)	in	all	other	contracts,	if	the	supplier	has	in	some	way	targeted	the	Member	State	
of	the	consumer’s	domicile.39		
Only	one	kind	of	contract	is	expressly	excluded:	transport	contracts	other	than	package	
trips.40	In	all	cases,	the	other	person	must	be	a	non-consumer	(a	person	acting	in	the	course	
of	his	trade	or	profession):	a	contract	between	two	consumers	is	not	covered.41	
The	special	jurisdictional	rules	may	be	summarized	as	follows:	
• If	the	consumer	sues	the	supplier,	he	can	bring	the	action	in	either	his	own	domicile	
or	in	that	of	the	supplier;42	
• On	the	other	hand,	if	the	supplier	sues	the	consumer,	the	action	must	be	brought	in	
the	consumer’s	domicile;43	
• These	rules	cannot	be	altered	by	a	choice-of-court	agreement,	except	in	certain	
specified	instances	in	which	it	is	considered	that	the	consumer	will	not	be	
prejudiced.44	
It	will	be	seen	that	these	rules	put	the	consumer	in	a	good	position.	However,	in	order	to	
benefit	from	them,	he	must	establish	that	he	is	a	consumer.	
Who	exactly	counts	as	a	consumer	under	the	Regulation?	The	definition,	given	in	Brussels	
2012,	Article	17(1)	is	simple	but	rather	uninformative:	a	consumer	is	a	person	who	
concludes	the	contract	‘for	a	purpose	which	can	be	regarded	as	being	outside	his	trade	or	
profession’.	This	is	in	essence	a	negative	definition:	everyone	is	a	consumer	unless	he	is	
acting	in	the	course	of	his	trade	or	profession.	The	other	party,	however,	must	be	acting	in	
the	course	of	his	trade	or	profession.	If	he	is	not	he	will	also	constitute	a	consumer	and,	as	
explained	above,	a	contract	between	two	consumers	does	not	benefit	from	the	special	
jurisdictional	rules.	
	
37	Although	the	rules	apply	in	principle	only	to	claims	in	contract,	they	can	also	apply	to	claims	in	tort	if	the	
claim	in	tort	is	indissociably	linked	to	a	contract	concluded	between	the	consumer	and	the	seller	or	supplier:	
AU	v.	Reliantco	Investments,	Case	C-500/18,	ECLI:EU:C:2020:264.	
38	Brussels	2012,	Article	17(1).	
39	What	this	entails	is	spelled	out	in	more	detail	in	the	Regulation.	
40	Brussels	2012,	Article	17(3).	
41	The	text	does	not	expressly	say	this,	but	it	is	generally	accepted	to	be	the	case:	See	per	Advocate	General	
Capotorti	in	Bertrand	v.	Ott,	Case	C-150/77,	ECLI:EU:C:1978:116,		[1978]	ECR	1431	at	p.	1450.	
42	Brussels	2012,	Article	18(1).	
43	Brussels	2012,	Article	18(2).	
44	Brussels	2012,	Article	19.	
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It	follows	from	this	that,	in	order	to	decide	whether	a	person	is	acting	as	a	consumer,	one	
must	first	decide	what	his	trade	or	profession	is	(assuming	that	he	has	one).	Then	one	must	
decide	what	the	purpose	is	for	which	he	concluded	the	contract:	was	it	for	his	trade	or	
profession?	
What	constitutes	a	trade	or	profession	(business)	is	the	more	difficult	question.	It	might	be	
thought	that	it	all	depends	on	whether	the	activity	is	intended	to	produce	an	income,	but	a	
moment’s	thought	shows	that	things	are	not	so	simple.	A	retired	person	who	invests	money	
to	produce	an	income	for	his	retirement	is	clearly	a	consumer.	This	is	so	irrespective	of	
whether	he	puts	his	money	in	a	building	society,	buys	an	annuity,	or	invests	in	a	fund	of	
some	sort.	What	if	he	plays	an	active	role	in	the	investment,	making	vital	investment	
decisions	himself?	This	is	what	happened	in	a	recent	case,	Petruchová.45	
In	this	case,	the	claimant,	Ms	Petruchová,	was	a	university	student	in	the	Czech	Republic.	
She	concluded	a	contract	with	the	defendant,	a	brokerage	company	incorporated	in	Cyprus,	
which	enabled	her	to	trade	on	the	FOREX	(foreign	exchange)	market,	concluding	financial	
contracts	for	differences.	This	was	not	her	main	activity.	In	addition	to	her	university	
studies,	she	had	a	part-time	job,	but	this	was	apparently	unconnected	with	her	FOREX	
trading.	
Various	arguments	were	advanced	as	to	why	she	should	not	be	regarded	as	a	consumer.	
One	was	that	she	took	the	vital	decisions:	she	chose	which	markets	to	trade	and	when	to	
enter	and	exit	a	position.	This	was	possible	only	because	she	had	some	knowledge	of	the	
FOREX	market,	knowledge	gained	when	she	had	previously	worked	in	the	financial	sector.	
Did	her	specialist	knowledge	make	her	a	professional?	Since	one	of	the	arguments	put	
forward	for	the	policy	of	giving	consumers	special	protection	is	their	lack	of	specialist	
expertise,	one	might	think	that	it	would.	However,	a	person	whose	hobby	is	fly	fishing	or	
bird	watching	might	have	great	knowledge	in	that	area,	but	this	would	not	prevent	him	from	
being	a	consumer	when	buying	equipment	from	a	supplier	of	such	things.	The	same	would	
be	true	of	an	artist:	he	might	have	extensive	knowledge	of	artistic	techniques,	including	the	
different	kinds	of	paint	and	how	each	should	be	used,	but	this	would	not	mean	that	he	was	
not	a	consumer	if	his	painting	was	only	a	hobby.	The	question	whether	it	was	a	hobby	or	a	
profession	would	not	depend	on	the	level	of	his	knowledge.	
It	might	be	thought	that	someone	trading	on	a	financial	market	was	in	a	different	position,	
but	Ms	Petruchová	was	not	suing	the	defendant	because	she	had	relied	on	its	specialist	
knowledge	and	it	had	failed	her:	she	was	suing	it	because	it	had	not	executed	her	order	on	
time.46	For	these	reasons,	the	CJEU	held	that	it	was	not	relevant	that	she	had	specialist	
knowledge	or	that	she	used	it	to	take	vital	trading	decisions	herself.		
The	CJEU	also	held	that	it	was	irrelevant	that	the	sums	of	money	involved	were	large	(she	
borrowed	money	from	the	defendant	to	make	each	trade	and	repaid	it	afterwards)	or	that	
	
45	Case	C-208/18,	ECLI:EU:C:2019:825.	See	also	AU	v.	Reliantco	Investments,	Case	C-500/18,	
ECLI:EU:C:2020:264.	
46	The	trade	was	only	executed	16	seconds	late	but,	in	the	FOREX	market,	16	seconds	is	a	long	time.	
10	
	
there	were	considerable	risks	involved.	The	issue,	said	the	court,	was	simply	whether	the	
particular	contract	in	question	did	or	did	not	fall	within	the	scope	of	her	professional	
activity.	This	was	a	matter	for	the	Czech	court	to	determine.	It	is,	however,	interesting	that	
Advocate	General	Tanchev,	whose	Opinion47	was	followed	by	the	CJEU,	considered	that	Ms	
Petruchová	was	a	consumer	in	relation	to	the	transaction	in	question.	
Another	recent	case,	Milivojević,48	throws	further	light	on	the	matter.	Ms	Milivojević	was	a	
Croatian	lady	who	owned	a	house	in	Croatia	which	was	her	residence.	She	borrowed	money	
from	an	Austrian	bank	to	carry	out	extensive	renovation	work	on	it,	in	order	to	create	flats	
for	rent;	however,	she	kept	open	the	possibility	that	she	might	use	some	of	the	money	for	
private	purposes.	Was	she	a	consumer	with	regard	to	the	loan	from	the	bank?	
The	CJEU	first	pointed	out	that	a	person	does	not	constitute	a	consumer	if	the	contract	is	for	
the	purpose	of	trade	or	professional	activity,	even	if	that	activity	is	only	planned	for	the	
future.49	Secondly,	a	person	who	concludes	a	contract	for	a	dual	purpose,	partly	for	use	in	
his	professional	activity	and	partly	for	private	matters,	is	to	be	considered	a	consumer	with	
regard	to	that	contract	only	if	the	link	between	the	contract	and	the	person’s	trade	or	
profession	is	so	slight	as	to	be	marginal	and,	therefore,	had	only	a	negligible	role	with	regard	
to	the	contract.50	As	a	result,	the	CJEU	held	that	Ms	Milivojević	could	be	considered	to	have	
concluded	the	agreement	as	a	consumer	only	if	the	link	between	that	contract	and	the	
professional	activity	in	the	form	of	tourist	accommodation	services	was	so	marginal	and	
negligible	that	the	contract	was	concluded	essentially	for	private	purposes.	
What	is	notable	about	several	recent	cases	is	that	the	CJEU	has	been	forthright	in	rejecting	
any	short-cut	tests	that	could	provide	an	easy	answer.	We	have	already	seen	that	specialist	
knowledge	used	to	take	strategic	decisions	is	not	relevant,	nor	is	the	amount	of	money	
involved	and	the	level	of	risk.51	Other	tests	that	have	been	rejected	are	whether	the	
contract	in	question	is	covered	by	the	consumer-protection	provisions	of	the	Rome	I	
Regulation;52	and	whether	the	person	claiming	to	be	a	consumer	is	a	‘retail	client’	under	
Directive	2004/39	on	markets	in	financial	instruments.53	In	another	case,	the	CJEU	held	it	
was	irrelevant,	in	deciding	whether	a	person	who	had	taken	out	a	loan	was	a	consumer,	that	
the	loan	was	not	covered	by	Directive	2008/48	EC	on	consumer	credit	agreements.54	It	
seems	that	the	CJEU	is	intent	on	ensuring	that	the	test	laid	down	in	Brussels	I	itself	is	applied	
as	it	is,	without	any	dilution	or	garnish.		
	
47	ECLI:EU:C:2019:3140.	
48	C-630/17,	ECLI:EU:C:2019:123.	
49	This	had	already	been	established	in	the	earlier	case	of		Benincasa,	C-269/95,	EU:C:1997:337,	paragraph	17	
of	the	judgment.	
50	This	had	also	been	established	in	an	earlier	case:	Schrems,	C-498/16,	EU:C:2018:37,	paragraph	32.	
51	Petruchová,	C-208/18,	ECLI:EU:C:2019:825	
52	In	Rome	I	(Regulation	593/2008),	the	definition	of	a	consumer,	set	out	in	Article	6(1),	is	very	similar	to	that	in	
Brussels	I;	however,	a	number	of	specific	types	of	contract	are	expressly	excluded,	one	of	which	concerns	
financial	instruments:	see	Rome	I,	Article	6(4)(d).	This	would	have	covered	the	contracts	concluded	by	Ms	
Petruchová.	
53	Petruchová	(supra).	
54	Pillar	Securitisation,	Case	C-694/17,	ECLI:EU:C:2019:345.	
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However,	though	it	is	useful	to	identify	false	leads	so	that	one	can	focus	on	what	is	relevant,	
the	question	still	remains:	when	is	an	activity	to	be	regarded	as	being	a	trade	or	profession?	
There	is	no	doubt	that,	for	some	people,	trading	on	the	FOREX	market	is	their	profession:	
how	is	one	to	distinguish	such	people	from	those	who	are	not	carrying	out	a	trade	or	
profession?	
It	is	not	known	how	Ms	Petruchová	supported	herself	and	what	her	income	was.	Would	it	
be	relevant	to	know	to	what	extent	her	FOREX	activities	contributed	to	it?	If,	for	example	
she	was	supported	by	her	parents	and	the	money	she	made	through	trading	was	something	
she	could	easily	do	without,	would	that	make	her	a	consumer?	If,	on	the	other	hand,	most	
or	all	of	her	income	came	from	her	trading,	would	that	mean	she	was	a	professional?	This	
possibility	was	considered	by	Advocate	General	Tanchev	and,	rather	surprisingly,	he	
rejected	the	idea	that	a	person	should	lose	the	status	of	a	consumer	if	the	profit	made	on	
the	FOREX	market	accounted	for	the	largest	part	of	his	income.55	His	argument	was	that	
such	an	approach	could	give	unfair	advantages	to	rich	people:	if	a	millionaire	and	a	middle-
class	investor	place	an	order	for	the	same	amount	on	the	FOREX	market,	and	they	make	the	
same	profit,	the	former	might	be	regarded	as	a	consumer	and	the	latter	might	not.	The	CJEU	
did	not	give	a	view	on	this	point,	since	it	was	not	one	of	the	questions	asked	by	the	Czech	
court;	so	the	possibility	may	still	be	open	that	this	is	an	appropriate	way	to	proceed.	It	is	
hard	to	see	how,	in	cases	like	Petruchová,	an	activity	that	provides	all	or	most	of	a	person’s	
income	could,	assuming	that	he	has	no	other	means	of	support,	be	anything	other	than	his	
trade	or	profession.	For	this	reason,	one	may	doubt	the	correctness	of	the	Advocate	
General’s	rejection	of	this	criterion.	
Finally,	it	is	interesting	to	note	that	the	general	policy	of	the	CJEU	seems	to	be	to	leave	it	to	
the	national	court	to	make	the	final	decision.	As	long	as	it	applies	the	right	test,	its	decision	
will	probably	be	respected.	This	could	give	the	national	court	a	significant	margin	of	
discretion.	
	
55	ECLI:EU:C:2019:3140	at	paragraph	52.	
